executions' and appeals to former atrocities by the whites. The New South Wales Council of Churches denounced the sentences as 'a crime upon our civilisation '.4 William McKenzie, Commissioner of the Salvation Army in New South Wales, wrote:
You are quite aware that their standards and ideals are very much different to those of the white race. They have standards down along the ages passed on to them. Doubtless, they looked upon those two white men as intruders into their particular domain, and so they felt they could do none other than kill them as enemies who had landed in their country.5 Many of the protesters showed some awareness of the validity of non-European cultural and ethical systems which, even if they were considered inferior, were conceded to be essentially comparable. Even if Aborigines were not to be allowed to conform to their own codes unhindered, it was argued that cultural factors should be considered as mitigating evidence by the courts.
The Lyons government could not ignore the torrent of condemnation. In July 1934 the sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. Some Sydney citizens still were dissatisfied. The Sydney Men's Bible Class resolved that all Aborigines serving life sentences in the Northern Territory who had been convicted of defending their women against white men should be released.6
Throughout this debate there was scarcely a mention of discrimination against New South Wales Aborigines. In fact a senior member of the Society for the Protection of Native Races, Bishop Coadjutor Kirkby, implied that southern Aborigines were of no concern at all when he told the Annual General Meeting of 1933, 'Whatever wrongs have been done in Central, Northern and Western Australia, are wrongs in which we all have some part, either directly or indirectly'.7 Yet it was not as though there was nothing to protest about in New South Wales. The decade [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] was perhaps the worst of the eighty-six year administration of the Aborigines Protection and Welfare Boards, an administration which was in toto very bad indeed.
Since 1909, when the Aborigines Protection Act was made law, conditions on the Board's reserves had steadily declined. In March 1916 the free issue of blankets to Aborigines was withdrawn.8 By May the issue of meat was withdrawn in areas where it could be shown that supplies could be made up by hunting or fishing.9 During the depression years the regulation meant that practically no meat was distributed at all: reserve children were entitled to 4 lbs of flour a week as basic nourishment.10 There were dozens of other regulations which managers were to enforce on pain of dismissal, which ranged from the weekly inspection of houses to the necessity of seeking permission to enter or leave a reserve.11 Buildings, many of which were already decrepit before the depression, underwent no improvement after 1930, despite the fact that reserve populations in the early 1930s doubled or trebled.12 Nor were Aborigines who lived away from the reserves spared indignity. Such people were obliged, for instance, to have the permission of a policeman before they could visit a doctor.13
Aborigines also suffered considerable discrimination through federal and state statutes. Although after 1927 Aborigines were eligible to receive the New South Wales Family Endowment, after 1930 it was distributed to almost everyone in rations, furniture, household or even station improvements. Scarcely any of the endowment, therefore, was transferable if a family left or was expelled from a reserve.14 Mothers, either Aboriginal or married to an Aboriginal, were excluded from the Maternity Allowance. Since Aborigines receiving benefits from the Board before the depression were ineligible for the dole the reserve populations swelled enormously, as did the fringe-camps on the edges of country towns.15 Faced with continuing pressure from local councils, in 1936 the Board passed an amendment to the Act which entitled authorities to remove any person classified as Aboriginal from insanitary or undesirable conditions to a designated reserve. The onus of proof of non-Aboriginality lay on the accused.16 Since by definition any fringe-camp could be considered undesirable, it followed that the town authorities had acquired the power to arrest a person on suspicion of being Aboriginal and forcibly remove him or her from a town. Yet even this extraordinarily repressive amendment, passed less than 18 months after the occasion of the Northern Territory protests, provoked very little comment.
Nor did there appear to be very much awareness that the thrust of this legislation and the general population movement towards the reserves in the early 1930s ran counter to the general policy pursued by the administration since about 1900. Codified in the Act of 1909, the policy looked to the day when there would be no reserves, no Board, no expense and no people claiming Aboriginal descent. In time the 'Aboriginal problem' would be solved forever.17 The nub of the perceived problem was the association of Aborigines with each other; the perceived remedy was the Several techniques to reduce the reserve populations were evolved after 1909. Amongst the most commonly used were the expulsion orders, by which men and women, unemployed or 'non-Aborigines' were prohibited from remaining on or entering one or more reserves. Over a decade more than a thousand people were so proscribed: one notification of 1915 contained the names of eighty-eight people.20 Another technique was the revocation o f thinly populated reserves by refusing entrance to all prospective residents, so that through natural wastage it was within a few years possible for the Board to revoke them as 'uninhabited'.21 The closure of the more populous reserves was more complicated. Natural wastage had to be supplemented by expulsions and threats; often the more obstinate residents had to be forcibly removed from their homes.22
The 21 An example of this process was the revocation of Grong Grong reserve, near Narrandera, in about 1900. It was declared in 1884 largely in answer to local white protesters who wanted to shift the Aborigines from Narrandera; then the Board changed its mind and refused almost all applications for residence, so that the reserve was deserted (or so it was claimed) by 1900 and revoked.
22 An example of this process was the closure of Warangesda reserve on the Murrumbidgee. Between 1909 and 1923 a fierce battle was waged between the Warangesda residents and the administration, at the end of which hundreds of people had been expelled for a variety of reasons. Local history relates that the last resident defended his home with a shotgun until the roof was pulled off. Though the depression put a temporary brake on the dispersal policy, its effects in the two decades 1909-1929 were staggering. There was hardly an Aboriginal family in the state, certainly not one living in close proximity to the whites, which had not been touched. Town councils, encouraged by what seemed to be a temporary truce with the Board, redoubled their efforts in the 1920s to rid their town of a fringe-camp or official reserve. In Wiradjuri country in the central-west, some thirty towns listed as having an Aboriginal population in 1883 no longer had one by 1930. Of hundreds of reserves in the state in 1900, there were only 71 in 1939.25 Of the children removed, at least a third never returned and were not heard of again. Mental hospitals, prisons, alcoholism and suicide awaited many of those taken so young that they did not know where to return, or so frightened by anti-Ab original propaganda in the Homes that they dared not.26 Worse, the Amendment of 1918 defined an Aborigine as 'any full-blooded or half-caste aboriginal who is a native of New South Wales':27 only such people were legally allowed to enter a reserve. To the whites of the country towns this definition was as meaningless as it was to the Aborigines themselves, whose criteria were self-identification and being of Aboriginal descent. The discrepancy between the official and the de facto definitions caused untold misery in the 1920s and 1930s. The hundreds of people whom the Board expelled from its reserves on the grounds that they were not Aborigines were in many cases immediately hounded from their new camps by the local councils on the grounds that they were. By the beginning of the depression many of the displaced people had spent a decade wandering from station to reserve to fringe-camp.
Perhaps it is not surprising that those who protested over events in the north in the 1930s were for the most part silent over the mundane brutality of those years. Most of them lived in the cities: they simply were not aware of the dusk-to-dawn curfews, the pursuits by alsatian dogs, the prisoners dragged through the streets handcuffed to mounted policemen, the children living on nothing but flour and tea, the windowless leaking huts, their beds sodden throughout the winter, the appalling infant mortality rate, the bulldozed houses. What is surprising in the light of the protests from so many diverse groups in the community about events in the Northern Territory is the silence which greeted the policy which allowed or encouraged such outrages. For while the mental and physical violence of dispersal was kept hidden, the ethical violence was perfectly plain. There were constant references in the Board's Annual Reports to the 'lazy' or 'irresponsible' who should be made to work in the white community. At least to 1925, the removal of children was justified on the grounds that they would constitute by remaining on the reserves 'a positive menace to the State'.28 The closure of reserves or the installation of a manager was openly attributed to pressure from the local whites.29 Yet apart from an article in the Sydney Morning Herald in 1926 which queried the justice of preventing Aboriginal wards from marrying Aborigines, there was little protest over the purpose of the policy.30 There seems hardly to have been an awareness that the official policy was dispersal, or that dispersal implied the extinction of Aboriginality, or that the extinction of Aboriginality meant nothing less than the extinction of Aborigines. There seemed to be little understanding that in the pursuit of dispersal the state regularly and on a massive scale violated the most basic human rights: to live at a place of one's choosing, in a manner of one's choosing and with the company of one's choosing; and to raise one's children in accordance with a chosen cultural inheritance. Official reasoning ran that Aborigines were doomed to extinction anyway and that Aboriginal culture in southern Australia was practically non-existent.31 A moment's objective thought could have detected the disjuncture between rationale and reality. After 1909 it was perfectly obvious that the self-identifying Aboriginal population was increasing rapidly: had that not been so, dispersal would not have been necessary. While academic debate took place in the 1930s as to whether it was genetically possible to assimilate Aborigines without detriment to the whites, the New South Wales administration, like those in other states, had been proceeding for decades on the basis that it was not only possible but desirable.32 The very fact that Aboriginal children were removed to be raised as whites gave the lie to the official dictum that Aboriginality was a matter of genes rather than culture. Clearly it was the socialisation of the children as Aborigines which the officials feared most. At the root of dispersal lay the fear of Aboriginal community from which Europeans were to be kept excluded.
This exposition of official policy throws the assimilation policy of the post Second World War years into a rather more sinister light than the well-meaning muddle by which it is sometimes portrayed. For the context of assimilation at the time of its adoption by the New South Wales government in 1940 was that, hitherto, dispersal had failed and failed catastrophically. Practice had demonstrated what a moment's thought should have foretold: that people could not be indefinitely expelled from reserves and camps because there was nowhere for them to go except to another reserve or fringe-camp, the nearest town council to which would then begin to abuse the Board. While almost everyone had been shifted from one place to another between 1909 and 1939, and the number of areas where Aborigines were living was smaller, Aboriginal community was almost as strong and defiant as ever.33 In September 1940 Board Secretary Pettitt laid the foundations of policy for the next twenty years. He began by explaining to the Board that the system which had been operating for many years had institutionalised Aborigines. Supplies had been made available to them 'without any exertion on their part'. They were not being called upon to shift for themselves. He presented a seven-point program: to inculcate the habit of self-help, to keep Aborigines occupied, to deal with youth, to apprentice outstanding talent, to select suitable families for removal from stations into the white community, to find employment for people away from the reserves, and to encourage local white people to become interested in Aboriginal matters.34 There was nothing particularly new about the program except the plan to move families into towns. The consequence of that helpful-sounding proposal however was far-reaching, for the town-housing scheme in the next twenty years became the principal pillar of assimilation. The 'carrot' of a town house would reinforce the 'stick' of reserve and camp clearance. In effect, the re-housing scheme provided the means to solve the hitherto intractable problem of where to put people expelled from the reserves. This is not the place to discuss why Pettitt's plan failed so dismally (by 1961 only thirty-nine new houses had been built in towns). The essential point is that assimilation was not a policy in itself, but a refinement of the continuing and much older policy of dispersal. The other 'carrot' of assimilation of the post-war years can be seen in the same light as the housing scheme. This was the Exemption Certificate system, by which on application adults were entitled to a few social service benefits such as the old age pension, provided the claimant did not live on a reserve. Certificate holders were also entitled to purchase and consume alcohol. The Exemption Certificate system in practice acted to condemn 'non-existent' Aboriginal values as much as to affirm the European. Certificates were granted to those who acted 'respectably', saved their money, did not abuse managers or left a reserve to live in a town. They were withheld from those who had 'too many' relatives to stay, shared their cheques with kin-folk or allowed their children to be raised by the extended family.35
The Board's records indicate that whatever the official rhetoric the intention of the state was as firm as ever. In the period 1945-1969 as many reserves and camps vanished as before: in Wiradjuri country Leeton, Darlington Point, Griffith, Gooloogong, Yass and Condobolin all lost at least one Aboriginal living area, while very strong pressure was put upon the people at the Brungle and Cowra reserves to quit. As many children were removed from their communities: nineteen children were removed from Cowra, which was regarded as one of the Board's trouble spots, but at Narrandera, which had a large but peaceful Aboriginal population, removals were nil.36 But the old problems of the Board remained. Aboriginal resistance was too strong, too few people wanted to join the larger community, too many children returned home. By 1969 the remaining reserves were fewer in number, but some were more populous and their inhabitants more militant. The implications of this analysis run in two directions. The first concerns why there was very much more protest about events and policies in the north than there were in the south. It seems that in New South Wales the dispersal policy was allowed to proceed because the public had fallen victim to that most dangerous of administrative myths, that the repression of a minority was for its own ultimate good, and that that good coincided with the greater good of the public weal. Even the many white-sponsored Aboriginal advancement groups of the 1950s fought their first battles for the right of Aborigines to live in towns, not to remain on reserves. For every ill-disposed, cruel, violent or pathologically disturbed official there were as many well-intentioned and conscientious individuals who did their best to persuade Aborigines to become white. They too contributed to the consignment of Aboriginality to oblivion. Truly the path to hell is paved with good intentions.
Dispersal is around us and within us. The same Joint Parliamentary Committee which recommended in 1967 that the Aborigines Welfare Board be abolished, recommended that no new houses be built on reserves. Instead Aborigines should be scattered about in towns 'and not concentrated in any one street or town'.37 In the 1970s the Board's housing function was absorbed by the Housing Commission. Similar policies to those of the 1950s seem to have prevailed. An internal report by the Department of Aboriginal Affairs concluded in 1979 that, for instance, at the Cowra reserve there was strong pressure on the residents to live in town. Newcomers were not allowed to move into vacant houses; several buildings, including the single-men's quarters, were demolished.38 In 1970 a new state-wide housing scheme was begun whose ostensible purpose was to remove Aborigines from areas of depressed employment. It was, and is, known as the Family Resettlement Scheme. It could hardly have been a coincidence that the first towns from which families were removed were Wilcannia and Bourke, two notorious 'problem' towns, or that the cities to which they were removed were cities of low Aboriginal population -Newcastle, Wagga and Albury. By 1980, 790 people had been moved under the scheme, enough to people half a dozen reserves. The fact that the scheme was voluntary was offset by the run-down condition of the Aboriginal quarters in the original towns, as well as the uncertain employment opportunities in the new towns.39 The proportion of Aboriginal children separated from their community or family in the last decade has remained extremely high. In 1980, 14 per cent of children in state institutions were Aboriginal, while Aborigines themselves made up less than 2.5 per cent of the state's population.40 An Aboriginal child-care agency was in 1980 refused permission to enter a major reformatory on the grounds that there were no Aboriginal children in residence. Subsequent research showed there to be some thirty children of Aboriginal descent in residence, some of whom, because of the failure of the institution to communicate with the parents, did not know they were Aboriginal. Others of the children, though dark-skinned themselves, were too frightened to speak to the Aboriginal field-worker.41 Clearly, the fear of Aboriginal community haunts the Europeans still. Whether today's dispersal results from state policy or the implacable momentum of the past is for present purposes irrelevant. So the question of public protest in the 1930s is also one of the 1980s. Aurakun and Noonkanbah have replaced Coniston and Caledon Bay. Dispersal precedes apace. The other conclusion concerns not continuity but perspective. Even in the memorable television series Women o f the sun (1983) it was not as apparent as it might have been that the actions of a violent manager were not just an unfortunate accident of employment, that the run-down condition of a reserve was not just the result of government parsimony, that a camp was destroyed not just through the greed of a speculator. So in real life it was not an accident that those thirty Wiradjuri towns lost their Aboriginal populations, or that the Wiradjuri can claim, under the New South Wales Land Rights Act, only some ten hectares of reserve land out of a former total of some 1,400. It is only through an understanding of the dispersal policy that the course of Aboriginal history in New South Wales can appear as something other than inevitable.
So too it is apparent that we cannot attempt to explain changes in Aboriginal social life, living patterns, culture or language unless the generalised context of dispersal is allowed. Besides the large number of people whose houses were razed, a much larger number shifted in anticipation, sheltered relatives or, in an attempt to save their own homes and hearth, cut themselves off from contact with other Aborigines. It was not just the children actually separated from their families who were affected, but the communities lacking the leadership of young adults, the extended families who could not forgive, the parents forced from their reserve dwellings rather than yield their children to the dormitory.42 Whether state policy caused anger or fear, defiance or misery, dispersal touched all New South Wales Aborigines, and touched them profoundly:
They have been forced to forgo much of their self-respect. All this 'metho' drinking is a manifestation of a cause: the alienation of the people from the land, the alienation of the people from their own culture, people denied any right to decide their own future, denied the basic powers every white man takes for granted in this country. This is the right to bring your kids up in the way you want to bring them up . . . For the last fifty years this has really screwed up just about every black person in this country. It is going to take another ten to twenty years to overcome the effects of this because the effects are so deeply ingrained in the kids, this kni o f inferiority attitude that before you do anything you must ask the white man cr it, you must ask permission.43 Until government departments learn to listen to Aborigines, a major responsibilt/ of historians is to inform the policy makers of the perspective of the past. For instarce, in 1980 an inter-departmental Commonwealth government team visited Brurgb Reserve, near Tumut. Its report remarked upon the paucity of the written records md the 'progressive diminution' o f the inhabitants. From the fact that only one familj in ten had moved back from Tumut to the reserve it was reasoned that no-one wantec to live there, and that no new houses would be built. The Board's records show that evuy technique outlined in this paper was enacted at Brungle to make the residents shift, including the refusal to carry out the most basic repairs. If the team had taken :fe trouble to talk to the former residents it would have learned the reality of the dispossession. It would also have learned that some fifteen Tumut families woxd move back to Brungle if only accommodation were available.44 I do not offer this discussion as an exercise in breast-beating but in the hope tha: n the next decade the context o f systematic dispersal will become better known ud understood. Such terms as 'invasion' and 'attempted genocide', which still appeal 10 stick in the typewriters o f some historians and others, will no longer be avoidel. I hope that an understanding of the policy and its consequences will provide a perspective on the changes o f the last eighty years, and for Australians of Europem descent, lead to an awareness of why Aborigines want to be left alone.
